- The question
- Agent harnesses fail open by default. What does it take to make deny the thing that happens when the system breaks?
- The instrument
- A proof-of-allow protocol: deny is the ground state, allow requires an unforgeable sentinel, and a kernel sandbox floor is the load-bearing boundary rather than the policy layer above it. Reference implementation in cosmic-cli.
- The finding
- Fail-closed is achievable across vendors without a shared runtime, provided the sentinel is unforgeable and the sandbox floor — not the policy engine — is what actually holds.
- What failed
- Policy-layer-only enforcement. Any harness where the policy engine is the boundary can be talked past by the thing it governs. The kernel floor exists because the earlier design could not survive that.
- Standing
- RFCPublished · v1.1Supported within scope
RFC
COSMIC-ALLOW
A cross-vendor proof-of-allow protocol for AI coding-agent cockpits: deny is the ground state.
Fail-closed by construction · Apache-2.0
Metrics with scope
Every number names what was measured, on what sample, and as of when.
Ground state
Deny
Protocol invariant; allow requires a positive unforgeable proof
As of 2026-07-20 · source
License
Apache-2.0
Reference implementation, cosmic-cli
As of 2026-07-20
From wonder to receipt
COSMIC-ALLOW
Wonder initiated the search. Rigor changed the answer.
- 01Wonder
Every agent harness I have used fails open. What would it take for the broken state to be the safe one?
- 02Hypothesis
If deny is the ground state and allow requires a positive unforgeable proof, then any failure of the policy layer degrades to refusal rather than permission.
- 03Instrument
A cross-vendor proof-of-allow protocol with a kernel sandbox floor as the load-bearing boundary, implemented in cosmic-cli.
- 04Encounter
Policy-layer enforcement can be talked past by the thing it governs. Only the sandbox floor survived that, which is why the floor — not the policy engine — is the boundary in the RFC.
- 05Standing
Supported within scope: the protocol holds across vendors without a shared runtime. Not a claim that any specific deployment is secure.
- 06Receipt
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21461197 · cosmic-cli, Apache-2.0